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1: Introduction: The Importance of Tradition
To pose the question "Does any appeal to tradition rest on mistaken
reasoning?" is to open up a field of critical inquiry. It is to establish the critical
basis for a quest.1 It is within the scope of this field of inquiry that I propose to
consider a set of possible responses to this question.
First, it will be useful to begin a critical response to this question with a
discussion of the significant difference that separates proponents of
acceptable appeals to tradition from opponents. These two audiences for any
particular argument involving an appeal to tradition take a significantly different
dispositional attitude to any such appeal. The difference in attitude serves to
determine, psychologically, an initially positive or negative response to our
question. The core belief or commitment which separates these two groups is
a priority given to either telos over process by proponents of tradition or
process over telos by potential opponents of any particular appeal to tradition
in an argument.2More often than not, the first group uses the appeal to tradition
in an argument and the second group criticizes its use. This produces a
distinct problem because the second group must convince the first group that
they have made a mistake and particularly a mistake in process. Proponents
of any appeal to tradition initially assume that there is no mistaken reasoning
involved in such appeals while opponents make no such initial assumption. So,
opponents who are disposed to believe in the authority of a critical process
assume that any appeal to tradition could be faulted depending on how it fits or
fails to fit an acceptable critical process. This establishes the basis for a
different relationship by each group to the same argument, which contains an
appeal to tradition. Initially then, one group is disposed to believe that any
appeal to tradition does not make any mistake in reasoning while the other
group is open to the possibility that some appeals to tradition could contain an
identifiable fallacy in reasoning and hence make a mistake in reasoning.3
Second, several textbooks in critical thinking or informal logic provide accounts
of what is identified as a fallacious appeal to tradition or the wisdom of the
past.4 The definitions used to identify this unique or distinctive fallacy differ
significantly. This provides a motive to critically evaluate these definitions. This
evaluation will be used to determine which of these purported definitions is
acceptable and thereby capable of being applied to particular examples. The
application to particular examples will be used in order to determine legitimate
appeals to tradition from illegitimate or fallacious appeals to tradition. A brief
critical analysis of some selected textbook definitions gives us some reason to
reject some candidates as unacceptable definitions and hence incapable of
being used as a test of legitimate appeals to tradition. This gives some
support to proponents of appeals to tradition (telos over process) since they
can claim that since attempts to acceptably define a distinct fallacious appeal
to tradition fail, there is reason to doubt that such an appeal is fallacious.
However, potential opponents of appeals to tradition or process-centred critics
could claim that this is simply a fault in some definitions of the fallacy and not all
of them. The situation makes clear the need for more critical care in devising
acceptable definitions of any fallacy and in particular this one. So, the impasse
remains between the two groups over an acceptable response to the initial
question of whether an appeal to tradition involves a mistake in reasoning.
Third, both groups need to take account of a possible paradox of tradition. The
paradox suggests there is a strong presumption in favour of existing or
traditional distributions over new or future distributions, practices or patterns of
behaviour. This may mean that, initially at least, any appeal to an existing
traditional pattern is as relevant as any appeal to a change in this pattern. This
creates a kind of standoff situation where neither the existing tradition nor any
proposed change can provide evidence which can be assumed to be
necessarily more relevant than the other. Any proposed definition and
application of a claimed fallacious appeal to tradition must somehow take
account of this possible paradox in order to provide a satisfactory account of
any mistake in reasoning.
Finally, in a process reminiscent of reflective equilibrium,[Rawls 1971:291] we
can critically evaluate two examples of arguments, which contain appeals to
tradition, to determine whether or not each provides acceptable and/or relevant
support for a controversial conclusion. The initial test will be to determine
whether or not each argument fails on account of fallacies, which do not contain
any explicit reference to a fallacious appeal to tradition. Then we can
determine whether or not the application of one proposed definition of a fallacy
of an appeal to tradition makes any difference to the evaluation of the
examples of arguments considered. That is, the final test will answer the
questions of when and under what conditions a fallacious appeal to tradition
could occur in an argument.
2: The Process and Telos Division
Appeals to tradition have a place in informal arguments. Their place may be
legitimate or illegitimate depending on certain membership conditions, which
will be specified and tested on particular claims shortly in this paper. Whether
an appeal to tradition rests on mistaken reasoning or not will depend on
whether the appeal satisfies some of the membership conditions used as the
test for legitimacy. Without prejudice, proponents of appeals to tradition will be
identified by a disposition to initially accept appeals to tradition because of the
prior importance given to the end or purpose such that appeals to particular
traditions serve. Alternatively, without prejudice, those who initially accept that
there could be good reasons to reject any appeal to tradition in an argument
will be identified as someone who puts process ahead of telos (or, who makes
the process itself the telos).5
Appeals to tradition will be tested as to whether or not they satisfy both the
process and the telos conditions for legitimate membership within the domain
of argumentation or reasoning. The process condition deals with how the
appeal to tradition is made within the argument context. So, for example, the
process of philosophical inquiry as described by Bertrand Russell is one which
begins with (a) critical questioning which leads to (b) a situation of uncertainty
(for the traditionalist and non-traditionalist) which leads to (c) liberating doubt
(from bias and prejudice born of the uncritical acceptance of traditional beliefs,
according to Russell) or (c*) (potentially) debilitating doubt (for the traditionalist
but not the non-traditionalist) which (for (c) but not (c*)) leads to (d) new
possibilities of knowledge. [Russell 1991:89-94]
The process is continual and cyclical so that the new possible knowledge at (d)
is itself subjected to (a) critical questioning, (b) uncertainty and (c) liberating
doubt. The end to be sought is a systematic and unified relationship between
the self and the universe but this end is not sought using any process other than
the one he describes. So, it is not the end which is of primary importance but
the end connected to or arrived at using a particular process of critical inquiry.
Any failure of an appeal to tradition will be due to a failure to follow this process
not a failure to achieve the end. Russell claims that critics of philosophy fail to
understand not only the process he describes but also the importance of this
process over any possible achieved end. I am not convinced that this is the
only description of the process known as "philosophizing" but it offers a useful
example of how an emphasis on process – if not this one, then one very much
like it - is valued in critical thinking and informal logic texts. Fallacies are often
described as those appeals, which violate one or more of the components of a
critical process, like the one described by Russell. This is the basis for
claiming that there is a fallacious appeal to tradition.
Russell, however, believes that what is crucial is the relationship in his process
between (b) and (c). For the liberated individual (that is, Russell’s philosopher
or student of philosophy) the uncertainty experienced in (b) is a good situation
which leads to (d) new possibilities for knowledge and eventually a new
relationship between the self and the universe. This process is working, as it
should, according to Russell’s description. For the telos-oriented person we
might call the traditionalist, however, the situation is quite different. The
uncertainty experienced by this person in (b) leads to (or, at least, could very
likely lead to) (c*) which is the experience of debilitating doubt. The uncertainty
does not necessarily produce good results for the individual in a situation of
debilitating doubt. So, the situation must be changed by a renewed appeal to
the stability and security of tradition. Russell might find such a response
reprehensible and intolerable but the supposed moves from (b) to (c) to (d),
consistent with his support for the process, are always open to continued
critical questioning.
The telos condition involves an emphasis on the purpose, goal and use of an
appeal to tradition to achieve a predetermined and prescribed goal. In some
versions of the contrast between political liberals and conservatives, the
difference may be between the liberal’s belief in the primacy of a critical
process and the conservative’s belief in the primacy of an end embodied in a
certain kind of community or political society. Any failure of an appeal to
tradition will be due to a failure to achieve the imagined or conceived end - a
stable and secure community - which is built on bonds involving central
appeals to tradition connecting the present to the past. Those who support this
general telos-based view of tradition include Roger Scruton, Socrates and
Carl Friedrich.
Roger Scruton argues that tradition is "essential to conservative dogma"
[Scruton 1980:40] since traditions form a central part of the identity of a society
and the individuals within it. Traditions arise and form a transcendent bond to
"define the citizen as subject".[Scruton 1980:42] They are a reminder of a
flourishing past revealing a "successful history"[Scruton 1980:42] engaging the
loyalty of their participants. They provide continuity and stability in the social
order, satisfying the end or purpose of the conservative state, even if no telos-
independent reason can be given for any particular tradition. Scruton goes as
far as to claim that "there is no general explanation of how men re-create and
accept traditions"[Scruton 1980:42]. One paradigm example he provides of a
necessary enduring tradition is that of the patriarchal family. The philosopher of
history, W.H.Walsh, seems to echo Scruton’s ideas about the use of historical
traditions "we can grasp them [thoughts and experiences from the past] in a
unique way because we can re-think or re-live them, imaginatively putting
ourselves in the place of the persons, past or present, who first thought or
experienced them…[this] is central in historical thinking, and explains why that
study can give us the individual knowledge which other sciences fail to
provide."[Walsh 1960:44]
Carl Friedrich suggests that, in some interpretations, tradition provides a
divine link between the past and the present such that "tradition has, since the
ancients, been linked to the sacred, indeed the divine".[Friedrich 1972:34] The
maintenance of traditions provides a link to a revered past, one which is
honoured and respected by present citizens. The end is specified and the
means provide the satisfaction through traditions of this end. While Socrates
rejects a version of Friedrich’s divine tradition claim, he introduces the idea of
new traditions to satisfy the same end – stability and harmony within the state.
This end is echoed in Scruton’s use of an appeal to tradition(s) as support for
his version of conservatism.
In the Republic, Socrates argues that the traditional patriarchal dependent role
of women should change dramatically so that women can assume managerial
duties within the rulership of the ideal state. In his discussion with Glaucon,
Socrates tests the new proposal to determine whether it serves the purpose of
the new state by being practical or possible as well as beneficial or useful.
Having satisfied these test conditions, the discussion turns to the creation of
new traditions to insure that this fundamental change in the relationship
between the genders will survive. New traditions will be created to insure
harmony, stability and unity within the new state and the means used to create
these new traditions include lies and deceit for the good of the citizens since
"all such things are useful as a kind of drug"[Plato:469d], according to
Socrates. Traditions are again used to supply the means to an end and the
process used to create and maintain them is essentially irrelevant to the
predetermined end. It is just the opposite for the process view, where usually
the means is more important than the end.
Scruton’s claims about the use of traditions are mirrored in the criticism of
them by Eric Hobsbawm who claims, contrary to Scruton, that many traditions
which claim to be old are in fact of recent origin, invented and re-invented to
suit some present social, political or ideological purpose. Also, the original
intent of some traditions can become subverted or given a different use and
goal by contemporary adherents. So, traditions are always fluid, not fixed. They
are in a process of being invented or re-invented to suit someone’s or some
group’s intended purpose or goal. Although the goal may change, the telos-
priority remains with the appeal to tradition forming the basis for this priority.
While the telos-based view relies only on the satisfaction of the end, the
process inspired view relies essentially on the use of an acceptable process to
achieve the end. Outside the use of an acceptable process, the end is
irrelevant or unacceptable. In evaluating the use of an appeal to tradition, the
traditionalist relies on a telos-based view while often the critic of an appeal to
tradition relies on a process-inspired view. This produces a break in the
audience for an appeal to tradition. One audience is initially predisposed to
accept an appeal to tradition because of the end that it supports. Another
audience is not committed to the end. So, this audience believes that the
process is faulted or misapplied. However, it seems necessary that both of
these general conditions, process and telos, must be satisfied for the appeal
to tradition within the context of an argument to be legitimate. While this may
be necessary for a clear resolution of any disputes, it may not be possible
because of the rifts between the two audiences.
Any appeal to a tradition within the context of an argument is irreducibly an
appeal to an acceptable process of transfer to achieve a prescribed goal. It is
a transfer of something from the past to present. Some transfers are legitimate
and some are not, depending on what is the intended result, for example, of the
transfer: explanation or justification.6Transfers that are illegitimate may rest on
one or more different kinds of mistake or misunderstanding of the accepted
process to follow. That is, the critic of the use of a particular appeal to tradition
in a passage may mistake the intention of the writer’s transfer as
argumentative when it is really explanatory.
Tradition involves a transfer of something, something from the past to the
present. The transfer relation can be interpreted according to the intentions of
the delivery. The transfer may be a combination or one of authority, justification,
explanation or authentication. Whether the transfer is legitimate or not depends
on whether the intention is to use the appeal to support an advancement of our
knowledge (explanation) or to support a contentious claim. For present
purposes, I will focus only on the difference between the explanation and
justification modes of transfer. If an explanation is intended to enhance our
understanding of something, advance our knowledge of something or provide
a causal account of the relationship between a set of events, then, in this
respect, it is different from a justification which is designed to support a
contentious or controversial claim using an argument. [Govier 1997:15-
21]Sometimes when an appeal to tradition is made the intention is to convey
an explanation not to provide a component of an argument. So, if this intention
to enhance an explanation or transfer relation is not satisfied then no fallacy is
committed, even though the explanation may fail on some other account or test
for a satisfactory explanation. It is a mistake to confuse this error in an
explanation with an error in argumentation since the two functions are not
identical in purpose or intention.
3: Explaining or Arguing for the Authority of Tradition?
The appeal to tradition is often an appeal to an authority and not a process.
Indirectly it may be an attempt to subvert a critical process. A process typically
leaves a sought after end or goal underdetermined, while an appeal to
authority is distinctively marked by an attempt to fix an end – the continuation of
a belief, practice or symbol – by means of an appeal to an authority. Often the
appeal to tradition is an appeal to an unquestionable authority – one that is, in
principle, not open to being questioned. How do you critically question such a
tradition? You do this by critically questioning whether or not the tradition
achieves the goal, end or purpose it was designated to achieve. It is often not
possible to question or to discover (even, in principle) the author(s) or source
of the tradition. While proponents of a tradition may identify themselves and
their world with a tradition, this identification is often an identification with a
suitable or successful reification for which no justification by a proponent
seems in order and any rejection by an opponent seems to the proponent
irrelevant. [Scruton 1980:42]
This appeal to authority is characteristic of irrelevant appeals which most texts
identify with the fallacy of tradition. Many texts claim that either the appeal is
irrelevant because it is a version of an irrelevant or improper appeal to
authority or because it appeals to the irrelevant authority of feelings, emotions
or other reputedly irrelevant psychological factors. It is always included in a
classification that is a version of an irrelevant appeal to authority. How it differs
or is distinguished from other appeals to authority remains underdetermined,
which is a serious problem for establishing its unique credibility as a fallacy on
its own. Of course, all such appeals to tradition either appeal to the past,
wisdom from the past or customary contemporary practices or relationships
from some version or interpretation of the past. However, this doesn’t
distinguish it from many other appeals to authority. Equally problematic is the
situation that for some audiences the appeal to a particular tradition is
acceptable or relevant, while for other audiences it remains unacceptable or
irrelevant. The process-inspired audience, for example, often considers this
appeal to tradition (like many other such appeals) to be a subversion of a
necessary critical process. The relevance of the appeal to tradition is then itself
relative to an audience’s prior acceptance of the appeal to this tradition or that
particular tradition. As Douglas Walton suggests, this still leaves open the
possibility for what he calls "positional reasoning" for both the process and
telos-oriented audiences. [Walton 1985:263]
It is a significant problem for both the telos and process-oriented position that
there is often no prior designated mode of alteration or accepted procedure for
change incorporated into the acceptance of most traditions. For example,
when a flag is created in a traditional form, there is often no explicit agreement
about when and how its structure, form, content and use will change and evolve
over a fixed period of time. This is similar to other symbols and other practices
which serve as instantiations of the same tradition or even different traditions.
So, the result is that proponents view any proposed change, which directly or
indirectly involves alteration, change or diminished authority for a tradition, with
possible alarm and suspicion. This is because change implicitly threatens the
desired end or purpose for the acceptance of the tradition. Change to a
tradition can be rejected because of the imagined chaos that could occur to
the desired end of stability and conformity with a perceived authority.
It is both the fixed end which is of primary importance along with the tradition
which serves to guarantee this end. For traditionalists, a contingent relation is
imagined to be some kind of necessary relation. This can help to establish the
basis for potential intolerance within a dependence on a tradition. This can be
part of a process sometimes known as reification. A sense of honour and
sometimes reverence or respect is attached to a tradition. What was a sense
of honour or respect, pride, dignity and self-esteem can become a kind of
dependence that generates possible intolerance for opposing views or critics
of the tradition. Those who intolerantly condemn intolerance often fall prey to
the intolerance that they share with their newfound tradition.
In the last thirty years in Canada the country has witnessed the responses by
vox populi to a change in the military forces from three forces, army, navy and
air force to one unified force, a change in the national flag from the Canadian
ensign to the Maple Leaf, a change in the system of measurement from
Imperial to Metric, a change in the national constitution from the British North
American Act to the current constitution.7In all of these cases, it is possible to
find ample evidence of (i) a confusion between a necessary and a contingent
relation between a tradition and a present practice (symbol, ritual, distribution,
pattern of behaviour), which can serve to foster intolerance, (ii) the lack of any
acceptable mode of altering a tradition and the incumbent fears for enduring
stability and authority that follow this situation, and (iii) belief in the relative
nature of ascription of appeals to relevant authorities (authorities depend on
whether a particular audience accepts them or not, which seems to be beyond
the pale of argument).
In the previous discussion, there was an attempt to show that whether an
appeal to tradition committed some fallacy, involving a mistake in reasoning,
depends on the intention or nature of the delivery of the appeal relative to an
audience. If there is a bona fide mistaken appeal to tradition, then this should
not depend on the appeal to an audience especially if there is taken to be
something universal about the appeal. To test this latter hypothetical, it may be
useful to critically evaluate some textbook definitions of the so-called fallacious
appeal to tradition.
4: A Critical Evaluation of Some Textbook Definitions of the Fallacy
A short (and definitely incomplete) survey of some informal critical thinking
texts provides an interesting, yet potentially confusing, array of variable
definitions of a fallacious appeal to tradition. The fallacious appeal to tradition
can (according to the authority represented in this set of critical
thinking/informal logic texts) consists in one of the following:
a. appealing to an audience’s feelings of reverence or respect for some
custom or tradition instead of evidence in order to support a viewpoint,
[Barry 1992:417] or
b. assuming or arguing that something is good or desirable simply because
it is old or traditional, [Rudinow 1999:285] or
c. the argument that uses the past to justify claims made in the present,
[Soccio 1998:69] or
(d) someone suggests that a belief is true because it has "always" been
believed [LeBlanc 1998:190], or
(e) when a tradition is questioned on its merits, it is a fallacy to argue that
raising the question is revolutionary, scandalous, or irreverent, or to merely
restate the tradition without showing its desirability. [Fearnside 1997:12]
Each of these five possibilities gives a different definition of the fallacy of an
appeal to tradition, which might suggest that each response is one component
of a complete, comprehensive definition of the fallacy. However, clearly some
of these definitions refer to mistakes in reasoning that have other designations.
So, most of these definitions do not refer to anything that one could uniquely
identify as a fallacious appeal to tradition. For example, version (e) seems to
refer in the first part to a fallacious appeal to what is identified in other texts as
loyalty or blind loyalty and commits one version of the fallacy of begging the
question, in the second part of the definition. Interestingly, this fallacy occurs in
the text under the general heading of psychological fallacies. There is some
reason then to question the implicit claim in (e) that there is a clear, distinct and
unique fallacious appeal to tradition. It may be a mistake to charge a fallacy
where there is nothing either unique univocal to identify the purported mistake
in reasoning.
The claimed definition in (c) fails to be an acceptable definition because it is
both too vague and too broad, since it potentially includes a wide range of non-
fallacious uses of appeals to the past. If it were acceptable, then much of what
constitutes serious scholarship in history would be rendered a priori fallacious,
contrary to good counterarguments. As one writer puts it"the notion that the
present needs the past in order to become the future is a truism."[Jurist
1992:181] This proposed definition for the mistake seems implausible as it
stands since it suffers from serious definitional defects8. This makes it open to
serious doubts as to its acceptability because the definition is too broad and
as such indeterminate in what it refers to or picks out.
If we consider the definition proposed in (a) there is a serious difficulty in the
assumption implicit in the definition of what constitutes "evidence". There is a
contrast between "an audience’s feelings of reverence or respect" and
"evidence" suggesting that the first is contrary or inconsistent with the second,
while leaving the second seriously underdetermined. However, the spectre of a
false dichotomy looms if one incorrectly assumes that "feelings" are not
evidence and diametrically opposed to evidence, when clearly a reference to
feelings is a reference to some kind of evidence. Feelings may not be
"relevant evidence" that is used as authority in an argument but feelings do
exist and are nonetheless evidence of certain dispositions or attitudes. This
provides the sort of evidence collected by pollsters in their frequent surveys of
attitudes and beliefs. That is, there is a well-supported belief that feelings are
evidence of something happening or occurring. The actual contrast is between
two sets of evidence or kinds of evidence, one taken to be relevant and the
other not relevant. It is clearly false to claim that the contrast is between
evidence and no evidence, especially when no acceptable definition of
"evidence" is supplied. So, this definition is seriously suspect since it could fall
into the trap of committing a fallacy itself. This leaves us with two possibilities
out of the initial five considered, definitions (b) and (d) both of which refer to the
irrelevant use of references to traditions or consistent repetitions as support for
a conclusion or sub-conclusion in an argument.
The reference in (d) to something "always" being believed is a version of the
fallacious appeal to authority sometimes identified as an appeal to numbers,
popularity or majority. Even though the reference to "always" suggests that time
is a relevant factor, clearly the focus is on the authority of numbers or popularity
represented by the unbroken period of time from the large set of believers in
the past to the present. So, it is not just because something is traditional or old
but rather because this feature of it represents its popularity. It seems possible
that this version is also not identifying a unique fallacy of an appeal to tradition
but another version of an appeal to authority sometimes called the appeal to
popularity. This, then, could be another failure to identify the defining conditions
of the unique fallacy of an appeal to tradition. It, however, seems to come
closest to the most acceptable definition represented in version (b) even
though I will subsequently show how this latter definition is open to significant
problems which could be addressed by revising this definition in various ways.
5: The Tradition Paradox
The tradition paradox is characteristically not identified in many textbook
responses to the fallacious appeal to tradition. The paradox may be expressed
as follows: Any relevant change (RC) to the traditional existing (symbols)
patterns of behaviour introduced in order to bring about improvements, a
redistribution of existing traditional patterns or new patterns of behaviour, will
inevitably run headlong into the relevant obstacle (RO) of existing traditional
patterns of behaviour.9The paradox is that RC is, at least, as relevant as RO.
So, no determination of relevance (either positive or negative) can, by itself,
unequivocally determine that RC is relevantly better than RO. Yet,
paradoxically, this seems precisely the basis for arguing in favour of the
change. This so-called obstacle (RO) represented by the traditional practice is
a relevant one because the endurance of certain patterns of behavior or
practices over time can make a positive difference to their cognitive or
psychological acceptance while making little or no difference to their logical
necessity or acceptance.
This positive psychological weight falls on the present existing practice,
grounded in the past, not the present projected towards an uncertain future.
[Gough:1985 and Walton 1985:263] The paradox is mirrored in the
predominant psychological tendency of a telos-based traditionalist audience to
accept the authority of existing traditions and resist any attempted change to
them. This is a factual psychological claim not a prescriptive claim about what
should be the situation. This is the basis for Hume’s problem.10 Critics of
appeals to tradition may confuse these two. Correct intuitive judgements about
any new patterns of behavior or distributions themselves rely on past evidence
and the relative success of these experiments. The new pattern at the time it is
suggested will be projecting some good, speculating on some consequences
or outcome and cannot immediately be demonstrated to be superior beyond
some hypothetical claims.
Our beliefs are organized into priority catalogues as John Dewey suggests or
within force field models as W.O.Quine maintains so that traditional beliefs are
held fast even under severe bombardments by new information at the
periphery.[Dewey:1984 and Quine:1970] The burden of proof seems to the
traditionalist to be on the proponent of change or process as opposed to the
traditionalist’s telos bent, since the latter provides a clear measure of trust,
security and stability which is always in principle unavailable to the former
because of the difference in the relation of time. The past is taken to be more
certain than the future, even though it is constantly revised by varying
interpretations of present views. Any identification of a fallacious appeal to
tradition must take account of this paradox in the qualified description of this
possible mistake in reasoning. Failure to do so leaves further room for
doubting that there is a bona fide claim to a fallacy known as an appeal to
tradition.
6: Testing Possible Examples of a Fallacious Appeal to Tradition
It may be useful to critically evaluate two examples, which intuitively could
contain an appeal to tradition. First, to determine whether there is any use for
the identification of a fallacious appeal to tradition, each example will be
critically evaluated to determine whether or not the premises provide the basis
for a cogent argument or not --without any appeal to a fallacy of tradition.
Second, each of the arguments will be tested with the use of an appeal to a
fallacy of tradition to determine whether (a) the latter makes any sense and (b)
the latter adds anything of any critical significance to the former interpretation.
This is to test whether there is anything added to a critical evaluation of an
argument with the addition of the charge of a fallacious appeal to tradition. If
not, then the repertoire of faults in reasoning – without the addition of any
fallacious appeal to tradition – is sufficient to critically evaluate those examples
reputed to contain the fallacy. This may cast further doubt on the efficacy of a
fault in reasoning identified as a fallacious appeal to tradition or wisdom of the
past.
Example 1: Against Reductionism
Arguing in favour of what he calls humanistic holism against other "defective"
versions of ecological holism, Don Marietta rejects any version of ecological
holism that "denies humanistic and personalistic values by reducing human
beings to their ecological role". [Marietta 1999:241] In this example, Marietta
makes reference to "generations of responsible thinkers" which intuitively
seems to be an allusion to the wisdom of the past or traditional views of the
past. He offers the following brief argument to demonstrate the "logical flaws in
the extreme forms of holism".[Marietta 1999:241]
P1: Reduction simplifies things by ignoring matters that are evident.
P2: Reduction simplifies things by ignoring matters that have been held
important by generations of responsible thinkers.
So,
C: Reduction is flawed.[Marietta 1999:242]
(a) Interpreting the structure and relation of the content of this argument within
its context I have separated two claims connected by the conjunct "and" to
indicate two separate ideas. If this is plausible, then P1 on its own could fail to
support the conclusion because the referent for "matters that are evident" is
indeterminate and vague. This is the same problem with the referent
"generations of responsible thinkers" which also fails on account of the fallacy
of vagueness. So, we are in a position to claim that the two pieces of support
provided for the conclusion fail to provide acceptable support and so the
argument fails to be cogent.
(b) If, however, P1 should be connected to P2 in linked fashion, then the
referent for "matters that are evident" repeats and/or refers to "matters that
have been held important by generations of responsible thinkers" in P2. The
premise P2 then could be faulted for committing the fallacy of tradition either
on its own or together when linked to premise P1. This makes the reference to
the wisdom of the past central to the claim in either the second premise or both
premises. What is significant is that both P1 and P2 on either interpretation
employ one version of the fallacy of improper appeal to authority, in this case,
an authority from the past. Both involve an appeal to an authority in which, at
the very least, the domain of expertise is vague. So, the argument can be
shown to fail on (a) and (b) interpretations without any use of a so-called
fallacious appeal to tradition to identify a unique mistake in reasoning.
Example 2: Protecting traditions of a language
The following example occurred in a newspaper report of comments made by
a French cabinet minister about aspects of the language employed in the
province of Quebec, Canada. The cabinet minister was reported to have
criticized Quebecers for "bending the French language in the name of political
correctness".11 In this example, there is an explicit reference to tradition in one
of the premises and an implicit reference in another premise. The argument
suggested by the comments reported in the article could be standardized as
follows:
P1: Using the term "personne" (person) to refer to both genders is against
French judicial traditions and philosophy.
P2: The term "homme" (man) is normally used to represent "people" in the
singular term (even though the term can mean, "man").
P3: Canadians, Quebecers and the United Nations in the name of political
correctness cannot bend The French language.
P4: The French language should not change because of pressure exerted by
Quebec feminists.
So,
C: Quebecers are wrong to use the gender-neutral term for "person" instead of
the word "man".
a. In this argument there are two clearly irrelevant versions of ad hominem
attacks in P3 and P4 as the disreputable motive of "political correctness"
is impugned to the entire group of those who propose the change to the
French language in P3 and an attempted guilt by association is put
forward in P4 with proponents of change associated with purportedly
disputed feminists.
b. So, the identification of any possible appeal to tradition occurs primarily
in premises P1 and P2. To determine whether or not the arguer commits
any serious fallacy or fallacious argument "that may be psychologically
persuasive, although incorrect"[Copi 1986:100] it may be useful to
consider what is intended in these two premises. What could be
intended is an explanation to help an audience understand the
conclusion or P1 and P2 could be intended as premises of an argument
to provide a justification for the conclusion (either directly or indirectly). If
the first interpretation is plausible, then there is no fallacious appeal to
tradition at the heart of this argument’s failure to be cogent.
On the basis of our evaluation of both these examples, we have some support
for the following claims. First, in both these examples, it is possible to
determine serious faults in the arguments and the reasoning used to support
the conclusion without applying any evaluation based on an appeal to the
fallacy of tradition. The application of such an appeal seems unnecessary and
any use of it would simply repeat the defining conditions of other fallacies. So,
this gives us some reason to believe that an appeal to the fallacy of tradition
may be superfluous since the mistakes made are based on fallacies other than
the appeal to tradition. The addition of this fallacy to our evaluation of both
examples would add nothing of any significance to our testing repertoire.
Second, any attempted appeal to the fallacy of tradition listed as potentially
acceptable version (b), which states the fallacy as: assuming or arguing that
something is good or desirable simply because it is old or traditional, fails to
distinguish between references to tradition in an argument which are used not
to support a controversial claim in a conclusion but to explain something or
advance our knowledge of something. So, in the first example, the two
premises may be explaining the process or consequences of the process of
reductionism and in the second example, the first two premises may simply be
explaining French judicial and language traditions without implicitly claiming
their plausibility as pieces of support in an argument. Even if the two
arguments contain appeals to tradition, it is not clear that these would be
fallacious appeals since there is no attempt to separate their use as a piece of
explanation from their use as a piece of justification. These critical
considerations open up some reasonable doubt about the viability of a claim to
a fallacious appeal to tradition.
7: Why Some Claimed Fallacious Appeals to Tradition May Fail to Persuade
We are now in a position to summarize the reasons why some claims to a
fallacious appeal to tradition fail to be persuasive. First, the appeal to this
particular fallacy is a confused appeal since the mistakes made are often to
another fallacy not the one identified as demonstrated in the evaluations of the
two examples. Second, the claim to the fallacy is often confused by some
questionable definitions used in some informal logic textbooks, definitions
which suffer some serious faults of their own. Third, the audience variance
leaves all uses of the irrelevant appeal to tradition open to question since
whether such an appeal is irrelevant is itself relevant to a particular audience
with a predisposition for process or telos. Finally, any appeal to change an
existing traditional practice or relationship runs up against the potential
problem of the paradox of tradition which demonstrates that the force of
relevance rests with the existing or traditional practice not the proposed
alternative. These considerations lead one to suppose that, at the very least, it
is not obvious that any appeal to tradition even in an argument is necessarily
fallacious and perhaps that some arguments which contain such appeals fail
for other reasons.
Endnotes 
1Simone de Beauvoir provides an excellent example of the approach
suggested here in her seminal work, The Second Sex, which I cannot hope to
approximate, as she instigates the important intellectual quest in response to
the question "What is a woman?"
2For a more detailed discussion of this critical point, see Gough:1985.
3At least one textbook discusses this important notion of audience variance
and its relationship to the belief systems of different audiences (Groarke 1997:
199-201). Earlier references can be found in: "The Use of Irony in
Argumentation", Christopher Tindale and Jim Gough, Philosophy and Rhetoric,
20:1987.
4The survey I conducted is incomplete and unscientific since it is based on a
random set of texts sent to me by various publishers over the last few years.
There is no respect in which this survey is representative of the entire set of
texts in the area.
5I use the legal phrase "without prejudice" to indicate that the use of this term
is as a heuristic device not to bias one interpretation over another or to beg the
question. It is my speculation that there will not be a great deal of variance in
the entire set from this set.
6In a paper "Tradition and Ways of Life" presented to a conference at the
University of British Columbia, March 13, 1998, I argue for four possible ways
of transferring traditions including an explanation for the difference between an
explanation and justification as well as authentication and authority. I will not
repeat that discussion here.
7In a Sourcebook for Critical Thinking [Gough:1983] there are several
examples in which the writer disagrees with a change to tradition. For those
interested, these minimally include examples 25,42,44,46,47 and 50 in this
text.
8Most informal logic texts contain a chapter or section on mistakes in
reasoning that involve definitions. For example, both Groarke [1997] and
Govier [1997:98-110] provide full and useful explanations. So, I leave it to the
reader to match their discussion to these examples and my critical evaluation
of them.
9An example of this kind of "Reformers Paradox" can be found in Nicholas
Rescher’s text, Distributive Justice, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, 121.
10There is a useful and accurate discussion of this problem in Govier:1997
page 296.
11This example is adapted from an article "That’s not French", Red Deer Life,
Sunday, March 30, 1997. The accuracy of the article is always open to some
doubt.
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